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ABSTRACT  
Automated vehicles will not only redefine the role of drivers, 
but also present new challenges in assessing product liability. In 
light of the increased risks of software defects in automated 
vehicles, this Note will review the current legal and regulatory 
framework related to product liability and assess the challenges 
in addressing on-board software defects and cybersecurity 
breaches from both the consumer and manufacturer perspective. 
While manufacturers are expected to assume more responsibility 
for accidents as vehicles become fully automated, it can be 
difficult to determine the scope of liability regarding unexpected 
software defects. On the other hand, consumers face new 
challenges in bringing product liability claims against 
manufacturers and developers.  
INTRODUCTION 
 The automated car1 is no longer a fiction. Tech companies, such 
as Google and Apple, as well as many traditional automakers, have begun 
investing in automated vehicle technologies.2  Most recently, Dyson, a 
company most famous for its vacuum cleaners, announced plans to 
develop an electric vehicle equipped with basic self-driving features by 
                                                   
† Duke University School of Law, J.D. expected May 2019; B.A. in Cinema and 
Media Studies, Carleton College, June, 2011. I would like to thank Professor Jeff 
Ward (Duke Law School) and the editors of Duke Law and Technology Review 
for their support throughout the research and writing process. 
1 While there are varying terms referring to automated vehicles, such as self-
driving vehicles, driverless vehicles, and autonomous vehicles, I will use the 
term “automated vehicles” as recognized by the National Highway Traffic 
Safety Administration (NHTSA). See Automated Vehicles for Safety, NAT’L 
HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ASS’N, https://www.nhtsa.gov/technology-
innovation/automated-vehicles-safety (last visited Apr. 19, 2018). 
2 Danielle Muoio, 19 Companies Racing to Put Self-Driving Cars on the Road 
By 2021, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 17, 2016, 1:12 PM), http://www.businessinsider. 
com/companies-making-driverless-cars-by-2020-2016-10/#honda-is-aiming-to-
produce-cars-that-are-completely-driverless-on-highways-by-2020-13. 
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2020.3 In addition to transforming one’s driving experience, automated 
vehicles also have great potential to improve road safety and reduce the 
risk of injury and death to passengers.4 Some of the benefits of automated 
vehicles listed in the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration’s 
(NHTSA) latest guidance for automated driving systems include a 
decrease in accidents, reduced traffic congestion, and increased mobility 
options for those with disabilities.5  
 This Note will review the increasing importance, and potential 
risks, of software safety in automated vehicles, as well as the challenges 
in applying the existing product liability theories to accidents caused 
solely by software defects in fully automated vehicles. While this new 
market is still in its infancy, the fast pace of technological advances 
requires policymakers to closely monitor development and ensure that this 
new technology is safely introduced into the public sphere. The accident 
involving Tesla’s Model S in May 2016, which resulted in the death of the 
driver, suggests that courts may soon be faced with cases analyzing the 
liability of accidents caused by fully automated vehicles.6 As cars become 
increasingly dependent on software and electronics, they will also become 
more susceptible to accidents caused by software defects.  Unfortunately, 
it is unclear whether current product liability theories will effectively 
resolve disputes regarding defects of the rapidly developing automated 
vehicle technology. Therefore, an adequate framework for assessing 
vehicle products liability regarding these new technologies should be in 
place to incentivize manufacturers to enhance the safety of these vehicles, 
                                                   
3 James Titcomb, Dyson Plans to Launch Electric Car in 2020, TELEGRAPH 
(Sept. 26, 2017, 4:45 PM) http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/ 
2017/09/26/dyson-build-first-electric-car-uk-2020/.  
4 JAMES M. ANDERSON ET AL., AUTONOMOUS VEHICLE TECHNOLOGY: A GUIDE 
FOR POLICY MAKERS 135 (2016).  
5 NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ASS’N, supra note 1. 
6 Preliminary Report, Highway HWY16FH018, NAT’L TRANSP. SAFETY BOARD, 
https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Pages/HWY16FH018-
preliminary.aspx (last visited Dec. 1, 2017) (noting that the driver of the Tesla 
Model S was using Tesla’s driver assistance feature when the car collided at 74 
mph with a semitrailer); see also Sam Levin, Uber crash shows ‘catastrophic 
failure’ of self-driving technology, experts say, GUARDIAN (Mar. 22, 2018, 3:32 
PM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/mar/22/self-driving-car-
uber-death-woman-failure-fatal-crash-arizona (self-driving Uber SUV struck a 
pedestrian crossing a street at night); see also Sean O'Kane,  
Tesla defends Autopilot after fatal Model X crash, THE VERGE (Mar. 28, 2018, 
11:46 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2018/3/28/17172178/tesla-model-x-
crash-autopilot-fire-investigation (Tesla Model X crashed into the safety barrier 
and the driver died from injuries sustained in the crash). 
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provide drivers appropriate expectations when it comes to safety and 
liability, and promote the use of these vehicles.   
I. BRIEF HISTORY OF AUTOMATED VEHICLE TECHNOLOGY 
 The idea of an autonomous vehicle was introduced to the public 
as early as 1939 at the World’s Fair in New York, where the theme of the 
international exposition was the “World of Tomorrow” and an automaker 
envisioned highway traffic able to move at “unreduced rates of speed,” 
achieved by maintaining a safe distance between cars through “automatic 
radio control.”7  Later, General Motors and the Radio Corporation of 
America developed automated highway technology and demoed the 1958 
Chevrolet Impala, equipped with technology that adjusted the steering 
wheel independent of any cues (steering) by the driver.8 In the 1980s, a 
German aerospace engineer, Ernst Dickmanns, tested a vehicle with 
cameras and microprocessors that drove 20 kilometers at 90 kilometers per 
hour. 9  In 1995, roboticists at Carnegie Mellon University tested the 
NavLab 5, which drove almost 70 miles without human intervention.10 
 The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) 
contributed to the significant development of automated vehicle 
technology by holding the first long distance competition for automated 
vehicles in 2004.11 Although none of the cars managed to finish the course 
in 2004, five vehicles successfully completed a 132-mile course in the 
following year’s Grand Challenge. 12  Sebastian Thrun, who led the 
development of Stanley, an automated vehicle which won the 2005 Grand 
Challenge, later started Google’s self-driving car project in 2009.13 As of 
May 2017, Google’s automated vehicle had driven without a pilot for three 
                                                   
7 See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 4, at 1; Jeff Quitney, Futurama 1939 New 
York World's Fair “To New Horizons” 1940 General Motors 23min, YOUTUBE 
(Aug. 7, 2012), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1cRoaPLvQx0.  See also 
Alan Taylor, The 1939 New York World's Fair, THE ATLANTIC (Nov. 1, 2013), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/photo/2013/11/the-1939-new-york-worlds-
fair/100620/. 
8 Tom Vanderbilt, Autonomous Cars Through the Ages, WIRED (Feb. 6, 2012, 
6:30 AM), https://www.wired.com/2012/02/autonomous-vehicle-history/. 
9 Id. 
10 Id. 
11 Denise Chow, DARPA and Drone Cars: How the US Military Spawned Self-
Driving Car Revolution, LIVE SCIENCE (Mar. 21, 2014, 2:27 PM) 
https://www.livescience.com/44272-darpa-self-driving-car-revolution.html. 
12 Id. 
13 Danielle Muoio, Here's Everything We Know About Google's Driverless Cars, 
BUS. INSIDER (July 25, 2016, 2:50 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/google-
driverless-car-facts-2016-7/. 
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million miles.14 Google has tested the vehicles in five U.S. states.15 In 
2016, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration acknowledged in 
one of its statements regarding automated vehicles that “partially and fully 
automated vehicles are nearing the point at which widespread deployment 
is feasible.”16 
II. INCREASED IMPORTANCE OF SOFTWARE SAFETY IN VEHICLES 
 Software is becoming increasingly important in conventional 
vehicles. John Paul McDuffle, the Director of the Program on Vehicle and 
Mobility Innovation (PVMI) at the University of Pennsylvania, stated, 
“the average Ford auto by 2010 already had more lines of code than a 
Boeing Dreamliner aircraft.”17 According to a 2017 independent advisory 
firm report, vehicle defects related to integrated electronic components 
and software are the likely cause of the increased number of recalls in 
recent years.18 For example, the report noted that General Motors recalled 
3.6 million vehicles in 2016 because the computers in the recalled vehicles 
could cause the airbags and seatbelts to malfunction.19  
 Inevitably, automated vehicles will involve more integration of 
complex technologies that might be vulnerable to internal software defects 
or a third party breach. Particularly, increased connectivity of modern 
vehicles poses a greater threat to software hacking than ever before. This 
concern was evidenced in a class action lawsuit filed against Toyota, Ford, 
and General Motors in 2015, alleging that the computer technology in their 
vehicles was susceptible to hacking.20 Also, in an experiment conducted 
by two security engineers on an unaltered 2014 Jeep Cherokee, engineers 
found that they could remotely control the Jeep driving at low speeds, 
                                                   
14 On the Road, WAYMO, https://waymo.com/ontheroad/ (last visited Dec. 1, 
2017).  
15 Id. 
16 “DOT/NHTSA POLICY STATEMENT CONCERNING AUTOMATED VEHICLES” 
2016 UPDATE TO “PRELIMINARY STATEMENT OF POLICY CONCERNING 
AUTOMATED VEHICLES,” AM. ASS’N MOTOR VEHICLE ADMINS. 1 (Jan 14, 
2016). 
17 Connected Vehicles: How Soon Will They Hit the Road?, WHARTON SCHOOL 
(Aug. 1, 2017), https://pvmi.wharton.upenn.edu/news/driverless-connected-
vehicles/. 
18 Neil Steinkamp, 2016 Automotive Warranty & Recall Report, STOUT 
ADVISORY (May 1, 2016), https://www.stoutadvisory.com/insights/report/2016-
automotive-warranty-recall-report. 
19 Id.  
20 Cahen v. Toyota Motor Corp., 147 F. Supp. 3d 955, 958 (N.D. Cal. 2015). 
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including its brakes and steering.21 Manufacturers can likely expect more 
product liability claims involving software vulnerability in the future.  
III. CURRENT PRODUCT LIABILITY TEST 
 In addition to a breach of warranty claim, under current tort 
liability theories, a plaintiff could claim that the seller or the manufacturer 
is liable for a vehicle defect under either strict product liability or 
negligence theory.22 While there may be variations across jurisdictions, 
the Restatement (Second) of Torts defines negligence as “conduct which 
falls below the standard established by law for the protection of others 
against unreasonable risk of harm.”23 In the case of a fully automated 
vehicle, negligence theory may not be appealing for plaintiffs since 
manufacturers will likely exercise reasonable care, or at least make it 
difficult to prove otherwise, to avoid causing any unreasonable risk of 
injury. Unless manufacturers recklessly fail to protect against standard 
risks involved in driving a vehicle, plaintiffs would likely fail to prove that 
the manufacturers’ conduct fell below the necessary standard. 
 On the other hand, manufacturers may still be liable under strict 
product liability regardless of whether they exercised the duty of 
reasonable care. 24  The three categories of defects under the product 
liability theory are manufacturing defects, design defects, and warning 
defects.   
A. Manufacturing Defect 
 Manufacturing defects can be found when the product does not 
meet the intended specification set by the manufacturer.25 The idea of a 
manufacturing defect is based on the expectation that “a mass-produced 
product will not differ from its siblings in a manner that makes it more 
                                                   
21 CHRIS VALASEK & CHARLIE MILLER, REMOTE EXPLOITATION OF AN 
UNALTERED PASSENGER VEHICLE 87–88 (2015), available at 
https://ioactive.com/pdfs/IOActive_Remote_Car_Hacking.pdf.  
22 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 402A, 281 (AM. LAW INST. 1979); 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2(a) (AM. LAW INST. 1998). 
23 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281 (AM. LAW INST. 1979) 
24 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 1 cmt. (a) (AM. LAW INST. 
1998) (noting it “is no defense that [manufacturers] acted reasonably and did not 
discover a defect in the product”). 
25 Id. at § 2(a) (“A product (a) contains a manufacturing defect when the product 
departs from its intended design even though all possible care was exercised in 
the preparation and marketing of the product.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 402A (AM. LAW INST. 1965). 
305          CRASHED SOFTWARE: ASSESSING PRODUCT  [Vol. 16 
LIABILITY FOR SOFTWARE DEFECTS 
IN AUTOMATED VEHICLES 
 
dangerous than the others.” 26  In the context of vehicle defects, the 
consumer would have to show that the vehicle, or the vehicle part, did not 
operate as the manufacturer warranted.  
 Plaintiffs might be able to use circumstantial evidence to prove 
that a product malfunctioned.27 Under this approach, plaintiffs would only 
have to show that “(1) the product malfunctioned, (2) the malfunction 
occurred during proper use, and (3) the product had not been altered or 
misused in a manner that probably caused the malfunction.” 28  For 
example, a court found Toyota’s vehicle at fault by applying the principles 
of res ipsa loquitor regarding an alleged sudden acceleration claim against 
Toyota when there was no traceable record plaintiffs could find from the 
defective vehicle.29 Courts might not always accept this theory, and they 
may disallow “plaintiffs or juries to rely on guess, conjecture, or 
speculation.”30 But, manufacturers should be wary of the uncertainty and 
lack of clarity surrounding their potential liability. 
B. Design Defect 
 A plaintiff can bring a design defect claim if the product is 
designed in an unreasonably dangerous manner. Under the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts, the consumer expectations test is used. The Restatement 
(Third) of Torts, however, rejects the consumer expectations test and 
instead adopts the risk-utility test to prove design defects.31   
1. Consumer Expectations Test 
 While the Restatement (Third) of Torts rejects the consumer 
expectations test, some states may still use this test.32 The Restatement 
                                                   
26 Casey v. Toyota Motor Eng'g & Mfg. N. Am., Inc., 770 F. 3d 322, 329 (5th 
Cir. 2014) (quoting Green v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 274 F. 3d 263, 268 
(5th Cir. 2001)). 
27 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2(a) cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 
1998) (describing the method as “a function similar to the concept of res ipsa 
loquitur, allowing deserving plaintiffs to succeed notwithstanding what would 
otherwise be difficult or insuperable problems of proof”). 
28 David G. Owen, Manufacturing Defects, 53 S.C. L. REV. 851, 873 (2002); see 
also White v. Mazda Motor of Am., Inc., 99 A.3d 1079, 1090 (Conn. 2014). 
29 In re Toyota Motor Corp. Unintended Acceleration Mktg., Sales Practices, 
and Prods. Liab. Litig., 978 F. Supp. 2d 1053, 1096–97 (C.D. Cal. 2013). 
30 Owen, supra note 28, at 878. 
31 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. g (AM. LAW INST. 
1998) (noting that “consumer expectations do not constitute an independent 
standard for judging the defectiveness of product designs.”). 
32 See Crump v. Versa Prods., Inc., 400 F.3d 1104, 1108 (8th Cir. 2005) (“A 
product is ‘actionable if dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be 
contemplated by the ordinary consumer, who either purchases it or uses it, with 
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(Second) of Torts defines a design defect as a “condition not contemplated 
by the ultimate consumer, which will be unreasonably dangerous to 
him.”33 To be “unreasonably dangerous,” the product “must be dangerous 
to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary 
consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the 
community as to its characteristics.”34 
 In McCabe v. Am. Honda Motor Co., the court further discussed 
the applicability of this test in a product liability action regarding a failed 
airbag.35 Accepting the application of the consumer expectations test, the 
court noted that an ordinary consumer’s expectations should not be 
assessed based on his knowledge of the product in isolation, but instead 
“in the context of the facts and circumstances of its failure” to see if he 
“can form minimum safety expectations.”36 However, not all courts will 
adopt the consumer expectations test for product liability claims, 
especially for technically complex issues. For example, in a plaintiff’s 
design defect claim regarding her vehicle’s airbag deployment that caused 
her injury, the First Circuit Court of Appeals noted that “consumer 
expectations cannot be the basis of liability in a case involving complex 
technical matters.”37  
Since automated vehicle technologies are still in their infancy, 
consumer expectations for “reasonable safety” are likely to change 
dramatically over time.  Although the public might be hesitant to believe 
in the safety of current automated vehicle technology, consumers will 
likely expect fully automated vehicles to operate in a reasonably safe 
manner once they become more readily available.38 The NHTSA ranks 
vehicles based on their level of automated technology.39 If the highest 
NHTSA level of automated vehicle technology is in fact achieved and 
                                                   
the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its characteristics’”); 
Griffin v. Suzuki Motor Corp., 124 P.3d 57, 63 (Kan. 2005) (noting that “the 
final test is one of consumer expectations” for a design defect claim). 
33 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. g (AM. LAW INST. 1979). 
34 Id. at cmt. i. 
35 McCabe v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 123 Cal. Rptr. 2d 303, 313 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2002).  
36 Id. 
37 Quintana-Ruiz v. Hyundai Motor Corp., 303 F.3d 62, 77 (1st Cir. 2002). 
38 See Jack Barkenbus, To Get the Most Out of Self-Driving Cars, Tap the 
Brakes on Their Rollout, CONVERSATION (Jan. 3, 2018, 6:25 AM), 
https://theconversation.com/to-get-the-most-out-of-self-driving-cars-tap-the-
brakes-on-their-rollout-88444. 
39 See Automated Vehicles for Safety, NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ASS’N, 
https://www.nhtsa.gov/technology-innovation/automated-vehicles-safety (last 
visited Apr. 19, 2018). 
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becomes available, ordinary consumers, as well as courts, might find it 
reasonable to expect a very high level of safety from automated vehicles.40  
2. Risk-Utility Test  
 While rejecting the consumer expectations test, the Restatement 
(Third) of Torts endorses the risk-utility test for design defects.41 The risk-
utility test finds a product to be defective when that product’s foreseeable 
risk of harm “could have been reduced or avoided” by adopting “a 
reasonable alternative design . . .” and not doing so “renders the product 
not reasonably safe . . . .”42 The Restatement (Third) further explains the 
balance between risks and benefits by adding that “excessively safe” 
products would not be any more beneficial than “products that are too 
risky.”43 
 Courts might evaluate a number of factors to assess whether the 
level of danger outweighs the utility of a product. For example, the New 
York Court of Appeals has identified seven factors to consider in a risk-
utility test:44  
(1) the utility of the product to the public as a whole and to the 
individual user; (2) the likelihood that it will cause injury (also known 
as the nature of the product); (3) the availability of a safer design; (4) 
the potential for designing and manufacturing the product so that it is 
safer but remains functional and reasonably priced; (5) the ability of 
the plaintiff to avoid injury by careful use of the product; (6) the 
degree of awareness of the potential danger of the product which can 
reasonably be attributed to the plaintiff; and (7) the manufacturer's 
ability to spread any cost related to improving the safety of the 
design.45  
The key to prevailing on a risk-utility test is to show a reasonable 
alternative design that would have reduced the risk of harm as noted in 
                                                   
40 See id. (noting the highest level of automation is when “the vehicle is capable 
of performing all functions under all conditions” and “the driver may have the 
option to control the vehicle.”). 
41 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. g. (AM. LAW INST. 
1998). Compare Branham v. Ford Motor Co., 701 S.E.2d 5, 16–17 (S.C. 2010) 
(remanding case for retrial using “risk-utility test and not the consumer 
expectations test”), with Aubin v. Union Carbide Corp., 177 So. 3d 489, 520 
(Fla. 2015) (adhering to the Restatement (Second) of Torts and adopting the 
consumer expectation test in a design defect case). 
42 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2(b) (AM. LAW INST. 1998). 
43 Id. at § 2 cmt. a.  
44 See Voss v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 450 N.E.2d 204, 208–09 (N.Y. 1983)  
45 Id. 
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element (3) and (4) above from the New York Court of Appeals.46 For 
example, under Texas law, to prevail on a design defect claim, “a plaintiff 
must prove that (1) the product was defectively designed so as to render it 
unreasonably dangerous; (2) a safer alternative design existed; and (3) the 
defect was a producing cause of the injury for which the plaintiff seeks 
recovery.”47 In some jurisdictions, the burden of providing the risk benefit 
analysis shifts to the defendant if the plaintiff proves that product design 
is the proximate cause of the damage.48 For example, in McCabe, the court 
held that once the injured plaintiff showed that the alleged design defect 
caused his injury, “the burden shifts to the defendant to prove the benefits 
of the design outweigh its inherent risks.”49 
 In the context of software defects for vehicles, plaintiffs might be 
able to use subsequent updates in the software as evidence of a reasonable 
alternative design. However, this would not be permitted in federal courts 
unless such updates were made prior to the accident due to Federal Rules 
of Evidence 407. 50  In contrast, state courts might allow subsequent 
measures by manufacturers as evidence for strict product liability claims. 
For example, the Supreme Court of California held that California 
Evidence Code § 1151, which bars the admission of subsequent remedial 
measures as evidence, applies to prove negligence or culpability but not 
strict liability. 51  Similarly, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin held that 
evidence of subsequent remedial measures regarding the suspension 
system of the vehicle at issue is admissible.52  
C. Warning Defect 
 Plaintiffs can also bring a product liability claim for a warning 
defect if “foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have been 
reduced or avoided by the provision of reasonable instructions or warnings 
. . . . ”53 In other words, manufacturers have a duty to provide adequate 
warning of danger and to provide reasonable instructions to use the 
                                                   
46 Daniel A. Crane et al., A Survey of Legal Issues Arising from the Deployment 
of Autonomous and Connected Vehicles, 23 MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV. 
191, 260 (2017). 
47 Goodner v. Hyundai Motor Co., Ltd., 650 F.3d 1034, 1040 (5th Cir. 2011). 
48 See, e.g., Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 573 P.2d 443, 455 (Cal. 1978); Collazo-
Santiago v. Toyota Motor Corp., 149 F.3d 23, 25–26 (1st Cir. 1998). 
49 McCabe v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 123 Cal. Rptr. 2d 303, 315 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2002).  
50 FED. R. EVID. 407 (“When measures are taken that would have made an 
earlier injury or harm less likely to occur, evidence of the subsequent measures 
is not admissible to prove . . . a defect . . . or . . . a need for a warning . . . . ”).  
51 Ault v. Int'l Harvester Co., 528 P.2d 1148, 1150 (Cal. 1974). 
52 Chart v. Gen. Motors Corp., 258 N.W.2d 680, 683 (Wis. 1977). 
53 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2(c) (AM. LAW INST. 1998). 
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product safely. Even without a manufacturing or design defect, a court 
might still find the manufacturer liable for failure to attach an adequate 
warning to a product. 54  An adequate warning does not absolve the 
manufacturer of a liability for other defect claims.55 However, risks that 
are obvious to an ordinary consumer, or the public, do not fall under the 
category of risks that manufacturers have a duty to warn their consumers 
about.56  
 Furthermore, depending on the subject matter regarding the 
alleged warning defect, expert testimony might be required. For example, 
the court in Ruggiero v. Yamaha Motor Corp., finding no need for expert 
testimony regarding a product defect claim for a personal watercraft, still 
noted that “expert testimony is required in a warning defect case where the 
subject matter ‘falls outside of the common knowledge of the factfinder 
and depends on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge.’”57 
For software defects of automated vehicles, courts are likely to find that 
the technical issues fall outside of consumers’ common knowledge.  
IV. APPLICATION/LIMITATIONS 
A. How Much Control Is Attributable to the Manufacturer or the 
Software Designer?  
 One of the most important considerations in the shift of focus on 
product liability assessment from regular vehicles to automated vehicles 
is: with the shift of control over the vehicle, which parties will assume new 
liability? As vehicles become more fully automated, accidents are less 
likely to be caused by driver error but more likely to be caused by product 
defects, and manufacturers may assume increased liability for accidents 
related to these mechanical errors.58 The challenge lies in determining to 
                                                   
54 See Battersby v. Boyer, 526 S.E.2d 159, 162 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999) (“[A] duty 
to warn can arise even if a product is not defective.”). 
55 See Uloth v. City Tank Corp., 384 N.E.2d 1188, 1192 (Mass. 1978) 
(“Whether or not adequate warnings are given is a factor to be considered on the 
issue of negligence, but warnings cannot absolve the manufacturer or designer 
of all responsibility for the safety of the product.”). 
56 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. j (AM. LAW INST. 
1998) (explaining that typically “no duty is owed to warn of obvious and 
generally known dangers”). 
57 Ruggiero v. Yamaha Motor Corp., No. 15-49 (JBS/KMW), 2017 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 48908, at *24–25 (D.N.J. Mar. 31, 2017) (quoting Jerista v. Murray, 883 
A.2d 350, 364 (N.J. 2005)).  
58 See GILLIAN YEOMANS, LLOYD’S EXPOSURE MANAGEMENT, AUTONOMOUS 
VEHICLES HANDING OVER CONTROL: OPPORTUNITIES AND RISKS FOR 
INSURANCE 18–19 (2014) (discussing the potential for increased liability to 
manufacturers of automated vehicles).  
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what extent the automated vehicle’s software or algorithm defect is 
attributable to the manufacturer.  
 One may argue that software is only as good as its designers and 
programmers, and those who design the software should be liable for any 
on-board software defect, including defects that may result from the 
designer’s failure to predict a particular problem. The accident of a 2005 
Toyota Camry that accelerated suddenly, injured the driver, and took the 
life of the passenger illustrates the difficulty of detecting a software defect 
before it is too late.59 The plaintiffs argued that the electronic throttle 
system of the vehicle had a design defect and caused the sudden 
acceleration.60 One of the plaintiff’s expert’s testimony during the trial 
illustrates the three problems that engineers face with preventing software 
defects.  
[J]ust because a company and its engineers think up 100 possible 
things that can go wrong, or a thousand possible things that can go 
wrong and implement a set of failsafes that they think will defend 
against them, there is two problems with that. The first is the failure 
of imagination possibility, which is it didn't get on their list. They 
forgot that it was possible that tasks could die, for example. Another 
possibility is that failsafe itself has a bug in it, a hole in it, a gap . . .   
So a third thing that can go wrong is that one of those gaps is exposed 
in the safety architecture. And sometimes it takes all three of those 
happening at once in order for your car to malfunction or to 
malfunction in a dangerous way that you report. For example, it 
might begin with a hardware . . . and that might cause a bug and that 
might escape detection because they didn't think of that possibility.61 
 Because a fully automated vehicle is expected to make decisions 
on its own based on its algorithm, manufacturers might argue that it would 
be impossible to enable such autonomous decision-making capability 
while still being liable for the vehicle’s decisions.62 Regardless of how the 
liability gets allocated between software designers and vehicle 
                                                   
59 See Brief for Petitioner at ¶ 11, Bookout v. Toyota Motor Corp., No. CJ-2008-
7969, 2013 WL 5596096 (Okl. Dist. Sept. 13, 2013), (No. CJ-2008-7969), 2009 
WL 9155882 (Okl. Dist. Sept. 16, 2009) [hereinafter Toyota]. 
60 See id.; Toyota Sudden Unintended Acceleration Lawsuit Ends in Landmark 
Verdict, BEASLEY ALLEN LAW FIRM (Oct. 28, 2013), http://www.beasleyallen. 
com/news/toyota-sudden-unintended-acceleration-lawsuit-ends-in-landmark-
verdict/.  
61 Transcript of Record at 60–61, Bookout v. Toyota Motor Corp., No CJ-2008-
7969 (Okl. Dist. Oct. 14, 2013) [hereinafter Transcript]. 
62 See John W. Zipp, The Road Will Never Be the Same: A Reexamination of 
Tort Liability for Autonomous Vehicles, 43 TRANSP. L.J. 137, 163 (2016) (“It 
will be virtually impossible for an autonomous vehicle manufacturer to conceive 
of every possible situation that may arise while driving.”). 
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manufacturers, both will argue that most if not all software defects should 
be treated as unforeseeable risks of harm. Also, it would be difficult for 
plaintiffs to argue that manufacturers should be fully liable for software 
defects caused by unusual external causes, such as hacking.  
B. Is Software a Manufactured Product? 
 Whether tort law regards software as a product, rather than a 
service, will also play a role in determining the application of product 
liability to software defects. A “product” is defined under the Restatement 
(Third) of Torts: Products Liability as a “tangible personal property 
distributed commercially for use or consumption.” 63  However, the 
Restatement does not consider services to be products.64  Unlike other 
component parts of a vehicle, because software is not a tangible 
“manufactured product,” a court might find that manufacturing defect 
theory is not applicable for software or algorithmic errors in automated 
vehicles. 65  While many courts have applied contract law in software 
related cases under the Uniform Commercial Code, software 
manufacturers have not been found strictly liable for software defects 
based on tort product liability theories.66 
 From the perspective of consumers, adopting strict liability would 
encourage manufacturers to perform enough tests to find and prevent 
                                                   
63 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 19(a) (AM. LAW INST. 
1998). 
64 Id. at § 19(b); see id. at § 19 cmt. a (“Apart from statutes that define ‘product’ 
for purposes of determining products liability, in every instance it is for the court 
to determine as a matter of law whether something is, or is not, a product.”). 
65 Roy Alan Cohen, Self-Driving Technology and Autonomous Vehicles: A 
Whole New World for Potential Product Liability Discussion, IADC PROD. 
LIAB. COMMITTEE NEWSLETTER (Int’l Ass’n Def. Counsel), May 2015, at 332, 
available at http://pbnlaw.com/media/540169/Cohen-IADC-Product-Liability-
May-2015.pdf; see also Jeffrey K. Gurney, Article, Sue My Car Not Me: 
Products Liability and Accidents Involving Autonomous Vehicles, 13 U. ILL. J. 
L. TECH. & POL'Y 247, 259 (2013). 
66 See Joseph L. Reutiman, Defective Information: Should Information be a 
“Product” Subject to Products Liability Claims?, 22 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. 
POL'Y 181, 195 (2012) (“Those courts that have determined whether computer 
software is a ‘good’ under the Uniform Commercial Code have struggled to 
apply a tangible–intangible distinction and have reached conflicting conclusions. 
Such courts have tended to focus on the service-like aspects of a software sale as 
compared to the tangible aspects of the software medium.”); Robert D. Sprague, 
Software Products Liability: Has Its Time Arrived?, 19 W. ST. U. L. REV. 137, 
140 (1991). But see Frances E. Zollers et al., No More Soft Landings for 
Software: Liability for Defects in an Industry That Has Come of Age, 21 SANTA 
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L. J. 745, 774 (2005) (contending that 
“software should be considered a ‘product’ for product liability purposes.”). 
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software defects before the software is released into the market instead of 
rushing to the market “in the hope that users will find the bugs and report 
them.”67 Some scholars note that software industry is “no longer in its 
infancy” and that limiting the application of strict liability to software “that 
foreseeably causes physical harm when defective” could minimize the 
concern over other software designers whose software are less likely to 
cause physical harm. 68  On the other hand, strict liability could 
significantly stifle innovation, especially since it could hinder software 
developers’ use of software written by other companies or software 
components that were freely available. 69  Likewise, manufacturers and 
software designers might argue that the automated vehicle industry is not 
mature enough to absorb all unforeseeable risks since spreading the cost 
among very few buyers will not be economically feasible.70 However, as 
automated vehicle technology matures, the argument that strict liability 
stifles innovation will likely lose its force. 
 How much direct control consumers have over vehicles’ software 
might also determine the applicability of strict liability.71 For example, 
when assessing liability for defects related to “extrinsic software” that 
consumers purchase and interact with directly consumers’ negligent 
behavior such as not keeping antivirus software up-to-date should be 
considered.72 However, software embedded in automated vehicles would 
likely be treated as “intrinsic software” since drivers might not be fully 
aware of the myriad list of software embedded in a vehicle, and prescribing 
strict liability might be appropriate.73 Considering the increasing risk of 
physical injury due to software defects, courts and federal agencies 
overseeing vehicle safety standards will soon have to determine whether 
or to what extent strict liability can be extended to software to ensure 
adequate consumer protection without deterring technological progress. 
                                                   
67 Zollers et al., supra note 66, at 769. 
68 Id. at 771. 
69 Seldon J. Childers, Don’t Stop the Music: No Strict Products Liability for 
Embedded Software, 19 U. FLA. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 125, 153 (2008). 
70 Id. at 173. 
71 T. Randolph Beard et al., Tort Liability for Software Developers: A Law & 
Economics Perspective, 27 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 199, 200–01 
(2009). 
72 Id. at 230.   
73 Id. at 230. But see Sean O'Kane & Lauren Goode, George Hotz is Giving 
Away the Code Behind His Self-Driving Car Project, VERGE (Nov. 30, 2016, 
2:12 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2016/11/30/13779336/comma-ai-
autopilot-canceled-autonomous-car-software-free (noting that open source 
software for automated vehicles might become a reality, and lie outside existing 
rules promulgated by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration).  
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C. What Is the Impact on the Cost of Litigation?  
 Although records of vehicle operation and software error will be 
more readily available thanks to advancements in technology, this might 
not be good news for consumers, as they will not be able to prevail based 
on circumstantial evidence. The plaintiff who sought a software defect 
claim stemming from Camry’s sudden acceleration problem in 2013 
would not have enjoyed the same decision by the court without admissible 
evidence specifying the defect if Toyota had tracked its vehicle’s software 
operation.74 For example, if the recorded data of an automated vehicle in 
an accident indicates that driver was warned by the system to take manual 
control, a court might find it difficult to hold the manufacturer fully liable 
for the accident.  
 Also, courts have hesitated to accept circumstantial evidence 
based on the malfunction doctrine if the vehicle has been used 
extensively75 or if it had been repaired.76 Therefore, if automated vehicles 
have been used for an extended period or shared among multiple drivers, 
courts might be reluctant to attribute liability to the manufacturer or the 
software designer simply based on circumstantial evidence. Furthermore, 
due to the complex nature of automated vehicle technology, finding an 
expert witness to testify will be difficult and expensive.77 Some plaintiffs 
might be turned away from bringing a claim because the cost of litigation 
would be too high and would not be covered by award.78 
 On the other hand, the cost of product liability litigation as well as 
the impact of litigation will be also be a concern for manufacturers of 
automated vehicles, which might lead them to mitigate product liability 
claims. 79  By avoiding a product liability claim, manufacturers could 
                                                   
74 In re Toyota Motor Corp. Unintended Acceleration Mktg., Sales Practices & 
Prods. Liab. Litig., 978 F. Supp. 2d 1053, 1102 (C.D. Cal. 2013). See also 
Toyota, supra note 59. 
75 See Corcoran v. Gen. Motors Corp., 81 F. Supp. 2d 55, 69 (D.D.C. 2000) 
(rejecting an inference of product defect for a vehicle used for over seven years).  
76 See Parsons v. Ford Motor Co., 85 S.W.3d 323, 326 (Tex. App. 2002) 
(holding that “the dealer's intervening repair and replacement of the allegedly 
defective” ignition switch precludes application of the malfunction doctrine).  
77 Gurney, supra note 65, at 265–66 (noting that multiple expert witnesses will 
be needed to assess the highly complex algorithm of an automated vehicle).  
78 Joseph Sanders, Adversarial Legalism & Civil Litigation: Prospects for 
Change, 28 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 719, 723 (2003).  
79 François J. Castaing, The Effects of Product Liability on Automotive 
Engineering Practice, in PRODUCT LIABILITY AND INNOVATION: MANAGING 
RISK IN AN UNCERTAIN ENVIRONMENT, 77, 79 (1994) (noting that “threat of 
product liability” can impede manufacturers drive to implement “new or 
improved designs” in vehicles).   
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protect the reputation of their products, consumer loyalty, and corporate 
goodwill, which will be especially crucial for the success of this new 
technology.80 Therefore, to control product liability exposure regarding 
their automated vehicles, manufacturers might be advised by their 
counsels to take preventive measures to avoid product liability exposure, 
including: proper warning, specifying policies regarding insurance and 
indemnification, and retaining experts.81  Additionally, courts often order 
the prevailing plaintiffs to recover attorneys’ fees from defendants in 
product liability claims based on the terms of the contract or statute.82 
Consequently, plaintiff-oriented attorneys might be willing to represent 
victims of automated vehicle related accidents on a contingency fee 
arrangement. This would lower consumers’ financial barrier to bringing a 
claim.83 
D. What Should Consumers Expect? 
 As discussed in section B, the Restatement (Third) of Torts rejects 
the consumer expectations test for design defect claims.84 Moreover, even 
if a court were to accept the consumer expectations test, consumers might 
not be able to argue that ordinary users’ expectations regarding automated 
vehicles should be the basis of assessing liability since it involves a 
complicated, developing technology. Also, software developers might not 
be able to predict every possible software error deviation from a vehicle’s 
expected operation.85 For example, an unexpected error not traceable or 
attributable to the software designer is certainly plausible if the vehicle is 
given the capacity to truly “think independently.”86  
 If it is unreasonable for manufacturers to expect automated 
vehicles to be foolproof, courts might find that consumers should also not 
expect automated vehicles to be entirely free of software defects. Also, 
                                                   
80 JEFFREY A. SOBLE, FOLEY & LARDNER LLP, PREEMPTING AND MITIGATING 
PRODUCT LIABILITY CLAIMS 2. 
81 Id. at 4–5. 
82 Bylsma v. Willey, No. 20140484, 2017 WL 5998937, at *22 (Utah Dec. 1, 
2017) (noting that a court may award attorney fees “through the reciprocal 
attorney fee provision of the Utah Code”); Cashio v. Kojis & Sons Signs, 568 
So. 2d 1388, 1389 (La. Ct. App. 1990) (noting that attorney fee may be awarded 
to the purchaser of the product in a product liability action). 
83 Id.  
84 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. g (AM. LAW INST. 
1998) (noting that “consumer expectations do not constitute an independent 
standard for judging the defectiveness of product designs”). 
85 See Transcript, supra note 61, at 60–61. 
86 David C. Vladeck, Artificial Intelligence & the Law: Essay: Machines 
Without Principals: Liability Rules & Artificial Intelligence, 89 WASH. L. REV. 
117, 123, 126 (2014).  
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while the risk-utility test requires a showing of “a reasonable alternative 
design,” one of the major challenges for consumers in prevailing over the 
risk utility test might be that the technology of the vehicle in dispute might 
be the safest available.87  The lack of a safer alternative design in the 
market would make the task of finding a reasonable alternative design 
almost impossible.88 
 As to warning defect liability, manufacturers of automated 
vehicles should be very cautious, trying to temper consumer expectations 
through their warnings. While manufacturers competing against each 
other will highlight the overall safety of their vehicles, they should also try 
to caution consumers against unreasonable expectations regarding their 
vehicles’ automated driving technology.89 Manufacturers might also need 
to provide real-time warnings through consumers’ vehicles once the 
vehicle detects that the driver is inattentive or is driving on harsh road 
conditions.90   
E. Is There a Solution? 
 Scholars have proposed a number of ideas to properly assign 
liability regarding accidents related to software defects in automated 
vehicles that are not clearly traceable to software designers or 
manufacturers. Despite the challenges reviewed above, liability for 
software defects caused by design or manufacturing error can be assessed 
in a similar manner as other product defects based on settled product 
liability theories. Therefore, finding solutions for rare software defects that 
are at odds with the software designer’s direction and cannot be traced to 
a human error will be most difficult.91   
 Conferring personhood on the vehicle has been one of the possible 
suggested solutions.92 By treating each automated vehicle as a separate 
business entity, victims of vehicle defects can bring claims against the 
vehicle without deterring manufacturers from producing more automated 
                                                   
87 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2(b) (AM. LAW INST. 1998).  
88 Gurney, supra note 65, at 265. 
89 See K.C. Webb, Products Liability & Autonomous Vehicles: Who’s Driving 
Whom?, 23 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 9, 40 (2016). (noting that manufacturers would 
seek to manage consumer expectations, and provide adequate warnings for safe 
use of AVs, while simultaneously encouraging use and advertising the overall 
increased safety of the product). 
90 Gurney, supra note 65, at 269–70.  
91 See Vladeck, supra note 86, at 126 (discussing that assigning liability for 
errors caused by human would not be difficult and that automated vehicles 
should be held at the same or even higher standard errors traceable to 
manufacturers).  
92 Id. at 129. 
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vehicles. In fact, NHTSA has recently indicated to Google that the 
artificial intelligence system in the autonomous vehicle could be 
interpreted as the driver.93 To do so, devising an insurance program for 
each automated vehicle that would enable the vehicle to be treated as the 
“driver” and compensate the victim would be necessary.94 For example, 
insurance costs might have to be factored into the purchase price of an 
automated vehicle.95 
  Also, manufacturers should be discouraged from setting 
unreasonable expectations for consumers during advertising and sales that 
their automated vehicles will be error free. 96  While customers buying 
vehicles today would not expect current automated vehicle technology to 
be completely reliable, the high expectations of modern day consumers of 
electronics would likely transfer to automated vehicle industry. 97 
Although manufacturers do not have to warn of obvious risks involved in 
driving, they should not set unreasonable expectations for the safety of 
automated vehicles and should be warned of potential risks. 98  If the 
software in automated vehicles require updates, manufacturers should 
alert end-users in a timely manner.99 Also, to prevent security breach, 
manufacturers should communicate critical security information to the 
end-users of automated vehicles in a timely manner.100   
 Manufacturers should also specify the allocation of liability with 
software vendors for potential software defects in automated vehicles.101 
If manufacturers and software vendors are separate entities, the contractual 
                                                   
93 David Shepardson & Paul Lienert, Exclusive: In Boost to Self-Driving Cars, 
U.S. Tells Google Computers Can Qualify as Drivers, REUTERS (Nov. 24, 2017, 
7:14 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-alphabet-autos-selfdriving-
exclusive- idUSKCN0VJ00H. 
94 Zipp, supra note 62, at 178. 
95 Id.  
96 See Vladeck, supra note 86, at 137 (recognizing consumer expectations are 
shaped by a manufacturer’s advertising and communication). 
97 See ACCENTURE MOBILITY, AUTONOMOUS VEHICLES: PLOTTING A ROUTE TO 
THE DRIVERLESS FUTURE 4 (2017). 
98 Vladeck, supra note 86, at 137. 
99 Mauricio Paez, The Internet of Things: Emerging Legal Issues for Businesses, 
43 N. KY. L. REV. 29, 53 (2016). 
100 FED. TRADE COMM'N., CAREFUL CONNECTIONS: BUILDING SECURITY INTO 
THE INTERNET OF THINGS 6–9 (2015). 
101 It is certainly plausible that technology companies will collaborate with 
vehicle manufacturing companies and provide automated vehicle technologies 
instead of being directly involved in vehicle production. See Daisuke 
Wakabayashi, Apple Scales Back Its Ambitions for a Self-Driving Car, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 22, 2017) https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/22/technology/apple-
self-driving-car.html.  
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limitations of liability for software vendors agreed between the 
manufacturer and software vendor might preclude consumers from 
bringing a claim against the software vendor. 102  At the same time, 
manufacturers might be able to limit their liability for on-board software 
defects. 103  This could leave the consumers with no one to hold 
accountable. One possible solution for allocating risk among all parties 
involved in making automated vehicles is to allocate risks born by 
manufacturers through a “workers-compensation-style” liability regime 
that shifts risks to insurance companies.104 Also, to minimize the concerns 
about having to rely on experts in any product liability claim involving an 
automated vehicle, courts should continue to accept the malfunction 
doctrine to allow circumstantial evidence.  
CONCLUSION  
 While widespread use of automated vehicles will significantly 
improve road safety, reduce traffic congestion, and improve mobility 
options for people with disabilities, it is unclear whether the current 
product liability theories can adequately assess and allocate liability for 
vehicle accidents caused by software defects. To encourage widespread 
development of automated vehicle technology, legislators must find a 
balance between deterring release of self-driving technology with 
inadequate testing and lowering the burden for manufacturers. A rule 
protecting consumers of automated vehicles by reducing the financial 
burden of pursuing a product liability claim could be one solution. Also, 
manufacturers could implement strategies to minimize product liability 
exposure and solve disputes in a timely manner in the event of malfunction 
to cultivate consumer interest in this new technology.   
                                                   
102 Crane et al., supra note 46, at 248.  
103 Id. at 232. 
104 Id. at 258. 
